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INTERCORPORATE LEASING ARRANGEMENTS
BY THE CLOSELY-HELD CORPORATION
Before 1937, wealthy individuals sheltered their investment incomefrom personal
tax by transferring assets to holding companies and leasing back these assets. The
addition of section 543(a)(6) to the Internal Revenue Code was designed to eliminate
the statutory loophole byforcing distribution of certain accumulated corporate earn-
ings to shareholders. This Note examines the workings of section 543(a)(6) in the
lessee/lessor corporate context. The section has ended the use of sham personal
holding companies, but has alsopenalizedunwary taxpayers who seek to set up legit-
imate holding companies. This Note seeks to break the resulting judicial deadlock
byproposing amendments to section 543(a)(6).
INTRODUCTION
THE PERSONAL HOLDING COMPANY provisions of theInternal Revenue Code' (the Code) were enacted in 19342 to
prevent wealthy taxpayers' use of "incorporated pocketbooks ' 3 to
shelter their investment income from their own high personal tax
brackets.4 Before the enactment of these provisions, such individ-
uals had regularly established personal corporations to which they
transferred their investment assets.' The income earned on these
investments thus accrued to the corporation, and was taxed at the
much lower corporate tax rates.6 Such income was then held and
1. I.R.C. §§ 541-547 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). These provisions are contained within
Part II of Subchapter G-Corporations Used to Avoid Income Tax on Shareholders.
2. Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-56, § 351, 48 Stat. 680, 75 1; see infra notes 12
& 102-11 and accompanying text.
3. This descriptive phrase is commonly used in the personal holding company area
to refer to the sham arrangements that the provisions were designed to eliminate. See H.R.
REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934).
4. For the test of what is considered a personal holding company and the discussion
of the Congressional Reports accompanying the 1934 provisions and subsequent additions
and amendments to the personal holding company provisions, see infra text accompanying
notes 112-22.
5. See H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934). This report accompanied
the passage of the original personal holding company provision in 1934.
6. It should be noted that the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-
34, § 10 1(a), 95 Stat. 172, 176 [hereinafter cited as ERTA] has decreased the maximum tax
rate on non-personal service income to 50%, effective for taxable years beginning subse-
quent to December 31, 1981. Despite the decrease in the maximum individual income tax
rate from 70% to 50% provided by ERTA the personal holding company provisions con-
tinue to be vital parts of the Code. For example, the maximum 50% tax rate on individual
income under ERTA is still much higher than the new lower bracket corporate tax rates
established by the Act. While the present rates of tax on the first two $25,000 brackets of
corporate net income are 17% and 20% respectively, I.R.C. § 11(Ib) (Supp. IV 1980), for a
combined tax rate of 18.5% on the first $50,000 of net income, by 1983 the Act will have
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accumulated by the corporation to be distributed to the taxpayer
in later years when, due to any number of conditions, the individ-
lowered these rates to 15% and 18% respectively, ERTA § 231(a), for a combined rate of
only 16.5% on the first $50,000 of corporate income. By 1983, moreover, the combined rate
of tax on the first $100,000 of corporate net income will be only 25.75% (calculated by
averaging the four surtax exemptions bracket rates)-barely more than half the maximum
individual rate.
It is these lower bracket corporate tax rates, and not the maximum rate of 46%, that are
the most significant in analyzing the need for the personal holding company provisions.
For instance, consider that historically long term investments have returned a rate of less
than 10%. Using even a historically high 10% rate of return, a $50,000 annual net income
would require a full $500,000 of investment assets. One hundred thousand dollars of cor-
porate net income, taxable at the aforementioned rate of only 25.75%, would require
$1,000,000 of investment assets. Even at a present long term return rate of 15%, these
annual income levels would require investment of $333,333 and $666,666, respectively.
Very few individuals, even in the 50% tax bracket (representing only $109,400 annual in-
come for a jointly-filed return, ERTA § 101(a), and $55,300 for a taxpayer filing a single
return, id.), have such large amounts of investment assets. This is especially true since only
individuals who may presently be earning high income but who anticipate lower income
and tax brackets on retirement might, if not for the personal holding company provisions,
make use of a sham investment corporation. The extremely wealthy taxpayer, who has
accumulated over $1,000,000 in investment assets, is probably unlikely to ever anticipate
lower tax brackets, and would thus not have tax reasons to use a personal holding
company.
A second reason for the continued vitality of the personal holding company provisions
is that one of the tax avoidance schemes that originally necessitated them had nothing to do
with the disparity between individual and corporate income tax rates. This was the practice
of transferring a pleasure asset, such as a yacht, to a corporation together with income
producing assets, and then deducting the depreciation and other expenses of the yacht from
the income generated by the investment property. The taxpayer could thus garner other-
wise unavailable depreciation deductions, all dependent, of course, on the establishment of
the pleasure asset expenses as deductible business expenses of the corporation. A more
sophisticated variation on this scheme was to try to show that the fair rental value of the
yacht was not equal to its depreciation and operating expenses. The taxpayer could then
lease the yacht for its fair value and transfer only enough investment assets to cover the
difference with his income. This variation made it easier to show that the yacht expenses
were ordinary and necesary. All these potential sham devices were left unchanged by
ERTA.
Finally, the personal holding company provisions are necessary to prevent taxpayers
from avoiding any personal income tax on their investment income by converting it into
stock appreciation that will never, by operation of I.R.C. § 1014, produce recognized in-
come if held until death. If not for the provisions, a taxpayer could transfer his investment
assets to his wholly owned corporation, where the accumulated income would increase the
fair market value of his stock without producing recognized gain to the taxpayer. Upon the
taxpayer's death, the stock would pass to heirs or beneficiaries with a stepped-up basis
equal to its fair maket value. I.R.C. § 1014(a)(l) (Supp. IV 1980). The only tax that might
be paid is an estate tax, and ERTA greatly reduces the chance and magnitude of this, as
well.
Congress apparently agrees that the personal holding company provisions are still nec-
essary, having chosen to retain the provisions despite the individual tax rate reduction,
while reducing the penalty tax from 70% to 50%. This reduction was made to correspond
with the lowering of the maximum individual tax rate to 50%. A similar adjustment was
made, from 90% to 70%, at the time the maximum individual rates were lowered to 70%.
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ual's personal income tax rate would be lower. These corpora-
tions came to be known as "personal holding companies."
The personal holding company provisions of the Code force
these sham corporations' accumulated earnings to be distributed
to their shareholders. The mechanism used to accomplish this is a
fifty percent surtax on certain .specially-defined undistributed in-
come known as "personal holding company income."'7 The tax is
imposed if at least sixty percent of the corporation's adjusted ordi-
nary gross income for the taxable year consisted of personal hold-
ing company income, and if certain additional ownership
requirements are met.
8
Section 5439 defines personal holding company income, de-
7. I.R.C. § 541 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The section reads in full:
§ 541. Imposition of personal holding company tax
In addition to other taxes imposed by this chapter, there is hereby imposed for
each taxable year on the undistributed personal holding company income (as de-
fined in section 545) of every personal holding company (as defined in section
542) a personal holding company tax equal to 50 percent of the undistributed
personal holding company income.
Id. Personal holding company income is defined in I.R.C. § 543 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
For a discussion of § 543, see infra note 9.
8. I.R.C. § 542 (1976). This section reads in pertinent part:
§ 542. Definition of personal holding company
(a) General Rule
For purposes of this subtitle, the term "personal holding company" means any
corporation (other than a corporation described in subsection (c)) if-
(1) Adjusted ordinary gross income requirement-At least 60 percent of its
adjusted ordinary gross income (as defined in section 543(b)(2)) for the
taxable year is personal holding company income (as defined in section
543(a)), and
(2) Stock ownership requirement-At any time during the last half of the tax-
able year more than 50 percent in value of its outstanding stock is owned,
directly or indirectly, by or for not more than 5 individuals. For purposes
of this paragraph, an organization described in section 401(a), 501(c)(17),
or 509(a) or a portion of a trust permanently set aside or to be used exclu-
sively for the purposes described in section 642(c) or a corresponding pro-
vision of a prior income tax law shall be considered an individual.
9. I.R.C. § 543 (1976). This section reads in pertinent part:
§ 543. Personal holding company income
(a) General rule
For purposes of ths subtitle, the term "personal holding company income"
means the portion of the adjusted ordinary gross income which consists of:
(6) Use of corporate property by shareholder
(A) Amounts received as compensation (however designated and from
whomever received) for the use of, or the right to use, tangible property of the
corporation in any case where, at any time during the taxable year, 25 percent or
more in value of the outstanding stock of the corporation is owned, directly or
indirectly, by or for an individual entitled to the use of the property (whether such
right is obtained directly from the corporation or by means of a sublease or other
arrangement).
Other subparagraphs of § 543(a) include as personal holding company income dividends,
mineral, oil, and gas royalties, copyright royalties, income from film rentals constituting
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lineating eight specific categories. In general, these consist of in-
come from passive forms of investment, such as dividends,
interest, and royalties. One of these categories, enumerated in sec-
tion 543(a)(6), consists of amounts received by the corporation as
compensation (however designated and from whomever received)
for the use of, or right to use, its tangible property. Such use must
occur where, at any time during the taxable year, twenty-five per-
cent or more in value of the outstanding stock of the corporation
is owned, directly or indirectly, by or for an individual entitled to
the use of the property, whether such right has been obtained di-
rectly from the corporation or by means of a sublease or other ar-
rangement.10 Subsection (a)(6) applies only if the corporation has
personal holding company income from the other categories for
the taxable year which exceeds ten percent of its ordinary gross
income. 1
Subsection (a)(6) was added to the Code shortly after the in-
ception of the first personal holding provisions. 2 It was designed
to address the problem of individuals who had circumvented the
original provisions by transferring to their holding companies
their personal assets, such as yachts and townhouses, in addition
to their investment assets. Such individuals would then rent these
assets from the corporation for their personal use. This rental in-
come was not classified as personal holding company income
prior to 1937. Thus, this technique would generate sufficient non-
personal holding company income to prevent imposition of the
surtax on the holding company's accumulated investment income
because the sixty percent personal holding company income re-
quirement of section 542(a)(1) would not be met. 13  Section
less than 50 percent of gross income, amounts received under personal service contracts,
and amounts relating to certain estates and trusts. I.R.C. § 543(a)(l)-(5), (7)-(8) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981).
10. I.R.C. § 543(a)(6) (1976). The legislative history of§ 543(a)(6) gives no indication
of what type of "other arrangements" Congress may have been contemplating in the use of
this language. The House reports are contradictory as to whether subsection (a)(6) was
intended to be construed broadly or narrowly. See infra notes 102-22 and accompanying
text.
11. I.R.C. § 543(a)(6)(B) (1976). Subsection (B) was added to § 543(a)(6) in 1959. Act
of April 22, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-435, § I(a), (b), 74 Stat. 77, 77-78. Although no reason
was given in the legislative history for the addition of subsection (B), it seems to be
designed to help bona fide businesses avoid the personal holding company penalty
provisions.
12. Revenue Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 82-377, 50 Stat. 813; see infra notes 112-22 and
accompanying text.
13. H.R. REP. No. 1546, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1937), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 703,
707-08 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT]. Actually, at the time of the passage of the
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543(a)(6) closed this loophole simply by treating the rent paid to
the corporation for the use of the personal assets by the share-
holder as personal holding company income.
While section 543(a)(6) appears to have effectively eliminated
this avoidance practice, it has unfortunately also served as a trap
for unwary taxpayers owning corporations engaged in bona fide
business operations.1 4 The owner of an operating business may
often choose to create a second corporation to hold the land,
buildings, and other property used by the principal business in its
operations. 5 The corporation holding the property-the "lessor"
corporation-leases the property to the "lessee"-the principal
corporation-for use in its operations. There are a variety of le-
gitimate business reasons for engaging in this transaction, such as
to secure legal tax advantages, or to control the underlying assets
that represent the real earning power of the operating corporation,
of which the individual may only be a part owner. In these ar-
rangements, of course, both the lessor and lessee corporations
often are owned by the same individual or small group of individ-
uals. The Internal Revenue Service has thus consistently main-
tained that the rent paid for the use of the property by the lessee
corporation represents compensation for the use of tangible per-
predecessor to § 543(a)(6) (formerly I.R.C. § 502(f)), the personal holding company provi-
sions required that 80% of the company's income be personal holding company income in
order to subject it to the surtax, instead of the 60% amount now required by current I.R.C.
§ 542(a)(1). The House report reads in pertinent part:
Subsection (f) includes in personal holding company income amounts received as
compensation for the use of, or the right to use, the property of the corporation.
However, this rule only applies where during the taxable year of the corporation,
25 percent or more in value of its outstanding stock is owned, directly or indi-
rectly, by an individual leasing or otherwise entitled to the use of the property. It
makes no difference whether the right to use the property is obtained by the indi-
vidual directly from the corporation or by means of a sublease or other-arrange-
ment. Since under existing law, this type of compensation is not now included for
the purposes of determining whether the corporation meets the 80 percent test, the
taxpayer may fix such compensation in an amount sufficient to bring its other
investment income below the 80 percent test. It has been shown to the committee
that this device has been employed by taxpayers who had incorporated their
yachts, city residences, or country houses and had paid sufficient rent to give the
corporations enough income from their service to take them out of present section
351 [which bears no relation to the modem section 351]. By including this type of
income in the definition of personal holding company income, your committee
removes this method of tax avoidance.
HousE REPORT at 6, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. at 707-08.
14. See infra notes 191-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases exemplify-
ing the danger caused by § 543(a)(6) to unwary taxpayers.
15. See, eg., Allied Indus. Cartage Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 515 (1979), ar'dper
cur/am, 647 F.2d 713 (6th Cir. 1981); 320 E. 47th St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 545
(1956), rev'd, 243 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1957); Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 4
T.C. 280 (1944), acq., 1945 C.B. 2, acq. withdrawn and nonacq. substituted, 1965-2 C.B. 7.
1982]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
sonal property of the lessor corporation from a twenty-five percent
or more shareholder under section 543(a)(6). 16 Moreover, in or-
der to eliminate indirect rentals as an abuse of the personal hold-
ing company, the Service relies on the "other arrangement"
language of subsection (a)(6). It asserts that the rental of the les-
sor corporation's property by the principal corporation, rather
than directly by the principal corporation's shareholder, consti-
tutes such an "other arrangement," giving the shareholder essen-
tially the same right to use the lessor corporation's property as he
would have had if he had rented the property himself.'7 The
Service regards this lessor-lessee corporation arrangement as es-
sentially an "insulating" device used by individuals to attempt to
evade section 543(a)(6) and thus avoid the sixty percent personal
holding company income requirement under section 542(a)(1) for
imposition of the surtax.'8 The basic problem with the Service's
position is that neither the lessor nor the lessee corporation in this
arrangement is a mere sham corporation created to avoid its own-
er's personal taxes. Both corporations exist for legitimate business
purposes exclusive of federal income tax consequences.' 9 Section
543(a)(6) thus traps unwary taxpayers who are not attempting to
shelter investment income, by subjecting the accumulated earn-
ings of their lessor corporation to the personal holding company
surtax.
This Note will discuss the applicability of section 543(a)(6) to
the lessor-lessee corporation arrangement. The Note will begin by
examining the historical position of the courts on the applicability
of section 543(a)(6) to these arrangements.20 The discussion will
provide typical scenarios and will explore the reasoning used by
courts in supporting their position. The Note also will illustrate
the present stalemate of countervailing authority that has evolved
from this judicial analysis. Discussion will next focus upon the
16. See, e.g., Allied Indus. Cartage Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 515 (1979), afdper
curiam, 647 F.2d 713 (6th Cir. 1981); Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C.
280 (1944), acq., 1945 C.B. 2, acq. withdrawn and nonacq substituted, 1965-2 C.B. 7.
17. See supra note 10; Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 280 (1944),
acq., 1945 C.B. 2, acq. withdrawn and nonacq substituted, 1965-2 C.B. 7.
18. See Silverman & Sons Realty Trust v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (P-H) 1 79,404
(1979), af'd, 620 F.2d 314 (1st Cir. 1980); 320 E. 47th St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.
545 (1956), rev'd, 243 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1957).
19. For an example of some of the possible reasons for the owners of a closely held
business to use the lessor-lessee corporation arrangement, see Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 280, 281 (1944), acq., 1945 C.B. 2, acq. withdrawn and nonacq.
substituted, 1965-2 C.B. 7 and infra text accompanying notes 34-38.
20. See infra notes 24-98 and accompanying text.
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evidence and authority for each of the competing positions.21
This examination includes evidence presented in the court deci-
sions discussed in the first section of the Note. The Note will then
examine the real cause of the controversy, 22 and conclude that the
present wording of section 543(a)(6) has produced a "no-win" sit-
uation, where adoption of either of the countervailing positions on
the applicability of the subsection to the lessor-lessee corporation
arrangement must necessarily produce some unfair results. Fi-
nally, the Note will present proposed amendments to section
543(a)(6) intended to eliminate this dilemma.23
I. ILLUSTRATION AND CASE LAW HISTORY
While the Internal Revenue Service has consistently main-
tained that the rental income paid between corporations owned by
the same person or small group of persons constitutes personal
holding company income under the "other arrangement" lan-
guage of section 543(a)(6), it has not been entirely successful in
litigating this position.24 The issue is not a commonly litigated
one,25 probably due to the wariness with which tax planners view
the personal holding company provisions, and because of the
overwhelmingly high percentage of tax disputes settled in the con-
ference and appellate stages. However, judicial treatment of the
issue has been inconsistent.26 The Tax Court has consistently
sided with the taxpayer in holding that the rental income involved
does not represent personal holding company income.27 It has re-
21. See infra notes 99-190 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 191-95 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 280 (1944), acq.,
1945 C.B. 2, acq. withdrawn andnonacq substituted, 1965-2 C.B. 7; 320 E. 47th St. Corp. v.
Commissioner, 26 T.C. 545 (1956), rev'd, 243 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1957). These cases are
discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 31-71.
25. This Note discusses all the significant court decisions to date in its examination of
the judicial history of the lessor-lessee corporation issue. See infra notes 24-98 and accom-
panying text.
26. Compare Allied Indus. Cartage Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 515 (1979), a 'dper
cur/am, 647 F.2d 713 (6th Cir. 1981) and Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 4
T.C. 280 (1944), acq., 1945 C.B. 2, acq. withdrawn and nonacq substituted, 1965-2 C.B. 7
with 320 E. 47th St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 545 (1956), rev'd, 243 F.2d 894 (2d Cir.
1957) and Rev. Rul. 65-259, 1965-2 C.B. 174.
27. See, e.g., Silverman & Sons Realty Trust v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (P-H) 79,404
(1979), afd, 620 F.2d 314 (Ist Cir. 1980); Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 4
T.C. 280 (1944), acq., 1945 C.B. 2, acq. withdrawn and nonacq substituted, 1965-2 C.B. 7.
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cently been joined by the First Circuit Court of Appeals.28 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals has sided with the Commis-
sioner,29 and the Service itself has issued a Revenue Ruling for-
malizing its position.3"
A. The First Litigation: Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc.
The personal holding company income issue was first litigated
definitively in Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc. v. Commissioner3' in
1944, seven years after the passage of the predecessor statute to
section 543(a)(6), section 353(f).3 2 In Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc.,
two individuals owned all the stock of an operating company en-
gaged in the funeral directing business.33 The same individuals
were the sole shareholders of Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc., a hold-
ing company that owned all the real property used by the operat-
ing company.34 The operating company was housed in buildings
owned by Minnesota Mortuaries and paid $18,000 in yearly rental
payments .3  The avowed purpose of the individuals in creating
this arrangement was threefold. First, they felt that it would in-
crease the efficiency of determining individual funeral costs. 36
Second, they believed that it would facilitate the operation of a
profit-sharing plan for their employees, in which contributions
should fairly be based on service business operations only.37 Fi-
nally, they wished to separate the risks incident to the operating
company from those of the holding company which managed real
estate.38
The Tax Court held that the rental income received by Minne-
sota Mortuaries was not compensation for the use of corporate
property by a twenty-five percent or more shareholder.3 9 The
court identified the real issue as being whether this arrangement
28. See Silverman & Sons Realty Trust v. Commissioner, 620 F.2d 314 (Ist Cir. 1980);
infra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
29. 320 E. 47th St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1957); see infra notes
61-67 and accompanying text.
30. Rev. Rul. 65-259, 1965-2 C.B. 174.
31. 4 T.C. 280 (1944), acq., 1945 C.B. 2, acq. withdrawn andnonacq substituted, 1965-2
C.B. 7; see infra note 70.
32. Revenue Act of 1937, ch. 815, § 353, 50 Stat. 813, 814.
33. 4 T.C. at 281.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 285.
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made either stockholder an "individual entitled to the use of the
property" of the corporation within the meaning of old section
353(f). 40 In rejecting such a reading of the statute, the court first
looked to the statute's legislative history. The Tax Court inter-
preted that history as indicating that the word "use" in the statute
must portend an actual use or right to use the property, rather
than a use imputed to the taxpayer merely from the acts of a cor-
poration in which he owns stock.4' Reference was made to the
House Report accompanying the section, which indicated a legis-
lative purpose to reach individuals who incorporated their per-
sonal assets to evade the personal holding company provisions.
The court emphasized that the rent paid was admittedly a reason-
able amount,42 and that there were bona fide business purposes
for the arrangement.43 This implied that there was no tax evasion
motive in the arrangement.44 Finally, the court relied most heav-
ily on the corporate entity concept. It emphasized the firmly rec-
ognized principle that an individual, as a stockholder of a
corporation, has no right, title, interest in, or right to use, corpo-
rate property.45 The acts of the corporation are not deemed to be
the acts of its shareholders.46 The court's reliance on the corpo-
rate entity concept is significant, since this represents a firmly es-
tablished judicial view that has been used in all of the subsequent
cases upholding the taxpayer's position. 47
40. Id. at 284.
41. Id. The House Report accompanying the statute evinced a legislative purpose to
reach the individuals who incorporated personal possessions such as yachts, boats, and
residences in order to evade the personal holding company provisions. See HOUSE RE-
PORT, supra note 13, at 6, 1939-1 C.B. at 708. This report, quoting the committee report of
the Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance, is quoted and discussed infra at notes
112-22 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of the statute's legislative history,
see infra notes 99-122 and accompanying text.
42. 4 T.C. at 285.
43. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. The corporate entity concept and its strength as a legal doctrine are discussed
infra at text accompanying notes 133-48.
47. See, eg., Silverman & Sons Realty Trust v. Commissioner, 620 F.2d 314 (Ist Cir.
1980); 320 E. 47th St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 545 (1956), rev'd, 243 F.2d 894 (2d
Cir. 1957). More recently, in Allied Indus. Cartage Co. v. Commissioner, 647 F.2d 713 (6th
Cir. 1981), the court rejected the rationale of 320 E. 47h St. in favor of that of Silverman &
Sons, which distinguished rents paid for tax evasion purposes from rents paid for bona fide
commercial enterprises. See infra discussion at notes 86-95.
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B. Growing Divergence of Authority 320 East 47th Street48
Twelve years passed after Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc. before
any court again considered whether rent paid in the lessor-lessee
arrangement for the use of corporate property constituted per-
sonal holding company income under section 543(a)(6). In the in-
terim, the old section 353(f) was recodified as section 502(f). 49 320
East 47th Street Corp. v. Commissioner displayed an ownership
and rental situation very similar to that in Minnesota Mortuaries,
Inc. This case also upheld the taxpayer's position, but differed
significantly from Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc. in both its reasoning
and conclusion.
The stock of 320 East 47th Street Corporation was wholly
owned by two unrelated individuals. In 1948, it received $6000 in
rentals from another corporation owned by these same individu-
als." The company also received $20,000 in interest on a condem-
nation award from New York City. The primary issue before the
court was whether the interest should be treated as personal hold-
ing company income to the corporation;5 the court ruled
affirmatively."
Thus, the rental income was a secondary issue raised by the
taxpayers. 3 Ironically, the taxpayers, not the Service, claimed
that the rental income should qualify under section 502(f). They
noted that in 1950 Congress passed section 22311 of the Code,
which specifically provided that section 502(f) would not apply to
rents received by the corporation from another bona fide business
enterprise during the years 1945 through 1950.11 Therefore, if the
individuals could show that the rent received in 1948 was section
502(f) income, it would not be treated as personal holding com-
pany income. Given the $20,000 of personal holding company in-
come involved, the $6000 of regular income would defeat the
48. 320 E. 47th St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 545 (1956), rev'd, 243 F.2d 894 (2d
Cir. 1957).
49. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 403, 52 Stat. 447, 558 (codifying the provision
under this section number as part of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939).
50. 26 T.C. at 546.
51. Id. at 546-47.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 548.
54. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 223, 64 Stat. 906, 947, as amended by Act of Au-
gust 11, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-370, 69 Stat. 693 (1955). Section 223 and its impact on the
question of the application of I.R.C. § 543(a)(6) to the lessor-lessee corporation arrange-
ment is discussed infra at notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
55. 26 T.C. at 548.
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then-existing eighty percent requirement.56
The Tax Court summarily rejected the taxpayers' argument. 7
It relied exclusively on the corporate entity concept, maintaining
that a corporation was a separate entity apart from its sharehold-
ers, who could not be deemed to be individual lessees of the prop-
erty in the corporation's place.5 8 The court further held that a
corporation was not itself an "individual" within the meaning of
section 502(f). 59 Therefore, the lessor-lessee arrangement did not
qualify under section 502(f), and the taxpayers could not rely
upon section 223 to avoid the personal holding company surtax.
The rent received was instead held to be rent within the meaning
of section 502(g), which would allow the taxpayers a temporary
exemption. °
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, dis-
agreeing with the Tax Court's conclusion regarding the applicabil-
ity of sections 502(f) and 223.61 The court concluded that the Tax
Court's decision would allow taxpayers to use section 502(f) to
create a second corporation to lease their own property.6z This
would allow taxpayers to escape the personal holding company
tax and frustrate the congressional intent in enacting section
502(f). 63 Such a scheme would provide the investing corporation
with enough nonpersonal holding company income to avoid the
56. Id. at 548-49. The total income of the corporation would thus equal $26,000
($20,000 + $6000). Without treating the $6000 rental as personal holding company in-
come, only 20/26, or 76.9%, of the corporation's income would qualify-not enough to
meet the 80% requirement.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 549.
59. Id.
60. Id.; see supra note 9 for the modem version of § 543(a)(2). One might wonder
why "compensation for the use of corporate property" under § 502(f) would not also con-
stitute "rent" under § 502(g), so that the compensation would be covered by both subsec-
tions. While on the face of the statute the subsections do not appear to be mutually
exclusive, the House Report accompanying the bill enacting both of the subsections pro-
vided specifically that "rents" under subsection (g) did not include compensation for the
use of property covered by subsection (f). HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 6, 1939-1 C.B.
at 708; see infra note 119; see also the discussion of this report infra in the text accompany-
ing notes 112-22.
61. 320 E. 47th St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1957).
62. Id. at 899.
63. Id. The Tax Court position announced in Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc. and 320 E.
47th St.-holding that § 543(a)(6) will not apply to the lessor-lessee arrangement in any
circumstances due to the corporate entity concept-is arbitrary and would allow even tax-
payers with a purely tax avoidance purpose to thwart the personal holding company provi-
sions by merely creating a second sham corporation to rent the property in their place. See
infra text accompanying notes 194-95.
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sixty percent requirement, just as if the taxpayer had rented the
assets directly. It would, in effect, allow the taxpayer to engage in
the very practice which section 502(f) was designed to prevent.
The Second Circuit believed that while it was true that including
the lessor-lessee arrangement under section 502(f) might otherwise
penalize businessmen using the arrangement for valid business
purposes, Congress had provided for their relief (at least tempora-
rily) by enacting section 223.64
The court found that the lessor-lessee arrangement came
within the "other arrangement" language of section 502(f).65
Therefore, it was not necessary to find that the lessee corporation
itself was an "individual" under section 502(f) as the Tax Court
had concluded, or that its individual shareholders be deemed the
lessees of the property in the corporation's place.66 The important
question, rather, was whether the arrangement indirectly gave the
two shareholders of the lessee corporation the "use of, or right to
use, property of the [lessor] corporation. ... 67 The Second Cir-
cuit's approach was to look at the practical net effect of the ar-
rangement and to minimize the detrimental effect to future
taxpayers using the arrangement for bona fide business purposes
upon the expiration of section 223.68
Relatively little controversy arose concerning the application
of section 543(a)(6) to the lessor-lessee arrangement in the period
following the 320 East 47th Street decision. That holding was ex-
pressly followed in Hilldun Corp. v. Commissioner,69 another Sec-
ond Circuit decision which merely cited 320 East 47th Street
without discussion. The Second Circuit's position was subse-
quently acquiesced to by the Internal Revenue Service in Revenue
Ruling 65-259.70 This Ruling cited 320 East 47th Street, using its
facts as an example of the type of situation in which section
543(a)(6) was to be applied.7
64. 243 F.2d at 899.
65. Id. The wording of § 502(0 was substantially identical to that of the present
§ 543(a)(6).
66. 243 F.2d at 899.
67. Id.; see supra note 9.
68. As discussed supra at notes 123-28 and accompanying text, § 223 was a temporary
provision expiring in 1953.
69. 408 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1969).
70. 1965-2 C.B. 174. In the same ruling, the Commissioner withdrew his former ac-
quiescence to Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc. and substituted a nonacquiescence therefore. See
1965-2 C.B. 7, 8 n.25.
71. Rev. Rul. 65-259, 1965-2 C.B. 174; see supra text accompanying notes 51-52 for a
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C. The Rebirth of Judicial Controversy: Allied Industrial
Cartage7 2 and Silverman & Sons
7 3
In 1979, the Tax Court rekindled the judicial controversy, first
in Allied Industrial Cartage Co. v. Commissioner,4 and again in
Silverman & Sons Realty Trust v. Commissioner." The Tax Court
held in both cases-under fact patterns substantially identical to
those in Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc.76  and 320 East 47th
Street77-that section 543(a)(6) did not apply to the intercorporate
leasing arrangement.
In Allied Industrial Cartage, the Tax Court, in an opinion sub-
sequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
again relied heavily on the corporate entity concept and refused to
impute the acts of the corporation to its shareholders.78 The court
also insisted that section 543(a)(6) was enacted with personal,
nonbusiness use of corporate property by a shareholder in mind
and had not contemplated the rental of productive corporate as-
sets by a lessee for use in its corporate business.79 This latter situ-
ation is potentially much more expansive since it could apply to
discussion of the fact situation in Silverman & Sons. Rev. Rul. 65-259 reads in pertinent
part:
Advice has been requested whether rental income derived from corporate les-
sees may constitute personal holding company income within the meaning of sec-
tion 543(a)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in the case of 320 East 47th Street... held that
where rental income is derived from a corporate lessee, the shareholders of the
lessee corporation indirectly have the right to use the leased property and such
indirect right is obtained by means of an "other arrangement" within the meaning
of section 502(0 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 (now section 543(a)(6) of
the 1954 Code). The Service believes that this decision reflects the correct appli-
cation of the personal holding company provisions of the Code to the extent that
the court so held.
Accordingly, it is held that rental income derived from a corporate-lessee, any
one of whose shareholders directly or indirectly owns 25 percent or more in value
of the outstanding stock of the lessor corporation, constitutes income from the use
of corporation property described in section 543(a)(6) of the Code.
Id.
72. Allied Indus. Cartage Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 515 (1979), a 'dper curtain,
647 F.2d 713 (6th Cir. 1981).
73. Silverman & Sons Realty Trust v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (P-H) 79,404 (1979),
afd, 620 F.2d 314 (1st Cir. 1980).
74. 72 T.C. 515 (1979).
75. T.C.M. (P-H) 79,404 (1979).
76. 4 T.C. 280 (1944), acq., 1945 C.B. 2, acq. withdrawn andnonacq. substituted, 1965-2
C.B. 7; see supra notes 34-47 and accompanying text.
77. 26 T.C. 545 (1956), rev'd, 243 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1957); see supra notes 48-67 and
accompanying text.
78. 72 T.C. at 518.
79. Id. at 520. The court stated: "It is manifest from the legislative history quoted
above [the 1937 House Report], and duplicated in section 1.543-1(b)(9), Income Tax Regs.,
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even individual twenty-five percent or more shareholders who
lease the corporate assets, so long as the assets are business assets
used by the shareholder for purely business purposes.
The court expressly rejected 320 East 47th Street without dis-
cussion, simply stating its decision to reaffirm its holding in Min-
nesota Mortuaries, Inc. 80 The court did, however, suggest that the
section 543(a)(6) discussion in 320 East 47th Street could be con-
strued as mere dicta."' The court did not attempt to support this
suggestion, and it is difficult to see how such an argument could be
made when the holding regarding section 543(a)(6)'s applicability
formed the basis of the Second Circuit's reversal of the lower
court decision. In any event, the dicta issue was not the basis of
the Tax Court's rejection of the 320 East 47th Street position. 2
The Tax Court shortly thereafter reaffirmed its Allied Industrial
Cartage holding in a memorandum decision in Silverman & Sons
Realty Trust v. Commissioner.83 The court simply cited Allied In-
dustrial Cartage as a reaffirmation of its Minnesota Mortuaries,
Inc. holding, and followed Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc. without
elaboration. 84 The Silverman & Sons court also discussed the pre-
vious refusal in Allied Industrial Cartage to follow 320 East 47th
Street and again asserted that the holding in 320 East 47th Street
regarding the applicability of section 543(a)(6) was merely dicta,
or at best an alternative holding.8" Once again, the Tax Court
failed to support this contention.
The Tax Court's short memorandum decision on review in
Silverman & Sons gave rise to a thoroughly reasoned and highly
significant opinion by the First Circuit Court of Appeals. 6 After
reviewing the previously discussed section 543(a)(6) decisions, the
First Circuit chose to affirm the Tax Court and adopt the Minne-
that subsection 543(a)(6) was enacted with personal, nonbusiness type use of corporate
property by a shareholder in mind." Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. The court's decision was based upon Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc.'s view of the cor-
porate entity concept, as well as the asserted intent of the statute to apply to the rental of
nonbusiness property. The court referred to the dicta issue in 320 E. 47th St. as follows:
"It can be argued that the language on which respondent relies constitutes dicta in the
Second Circuit's opinion. However, no matter what its characterization, we respectfully
decline to follow it." 72 T.C. at 520 (emphasis added). This language indicates that the
dicta issue was not the basis of the court's rejection of 320 E 47th Street.
83. T.C.M. (P-H) 79,404 (1979), aft'd, 620 F.2d 314 (Ist Cir. 1980).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Silverman & Sons Realty Trust v. Commissioner, 620 F.2d 314 (lst Cir. 1980).
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sota Mortuaries, Inc. line of reasoning, placing itself at odds with
the Second Circuit and producing a stalemate of judicial
authority.
The Commissioner's argument on appeal closely paralleled the
Second Circuit's decision in 320 East 47th Street.87 The Commis-
sioner insisted that the lessor-lessee arrangement could properly
fit within the "other arrangement" provision of section 543(a)(6),
and that to hold otherwise would enable scheming taxpayers to
avoid section 543(a)(6) and the personal holding company penalty
tax merely by interposing a second sham corporation as the osten-
sible lessee.88
In rejecting the Commissioner's argument, the First Circuit
applied an approach not presented in the Minnesota Mortuaries,
Inc. line of cases. It placed primary emphasis on the presence or
absence of a tax avoidance purpose.89 The court stated that if the
lessee corporation has been established solely for the purpose of
avoiding section 543(a)(6), that fact should be readily ascertain-
able and appropriate measures may be taken, including piercing
the corporate veil, to insure that the personal holding company
provisions are not frustrated. This will plainly be the case where
the leased property consists of personal or recreational property or
in other instances where the property is being placed at the dispo-
sal of the individual shareholders for their personal use.90 How-
ever, the court held that a bona fide lessor-lessee corporation
arrangement set up for valid business purposes, such as those
present in Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc. is not the equivalent of an
"other arrangement" under section 543(a)(6). 91 The court empha-
sized that while a "sublease or other arrangement" might legally
authorize personal use of leased property, a corporation qua cor-
poration does not provide such authorization. Furthermore, the
shareholders of a corporation have no legal right to reach the cor-
poration's property for their own personal use.92
87. Id. at 318; see supra text accompanying notes 61-67.
88. See supra text accompanying note 63 and infra notes 194-95.
89. 620 F.2d at 318-19.
90. Here the court suggests two factors which should be considered as part of the
examination to ascertain the existence of a tax evasion purpose: The type of property in-
volved-business or nonbusiness-and whether the individual shareholder has in fact ac-
quired any right to personal use of the property. Guidelines such as these would be helpful
in the administration of the proposed test. Id. at 316.
91. Id. at 318.
92. Id. This is merely the statement of the corporate entity concept relied upon heav-
ily in the Tax Court decisions. See supra notes 46-47 & 58 and accompanying text.
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The decision of the First Circuit thus turned upon the issue of
whether section 543(a)(6) should be construed to impute to indi-
vidual shareholders the property rights possessed by their corpora-
tion. To do so would contradict the well-established corporate
entity concept93 referred to in the Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc. line
of decisions. Therefore, the courts should be reluctant to take such
a step.94 However, that step may be appropriate when necessary
to prevent a known tax avoidance scheme.95 In the First Circuit's
view, therefore, the inqury should focus on the presence or ab-
sence of a tax avoidance purpose.
The decision of the First Circuit in Silverman & Sons and the
Sixth Circuit's following of the First Circuit in Allied Industrial
Cartage, therefore, are at loggerheads with the position of the Sec-
ond Circuit regarding the applicability of section 543(a)(6) to the
lessor-lessee corporate arrangement. The First and Sixth Circuits
adopt the longstanding position of the Tax Court, beginning with
Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc.96 that this relationship does not consti-
tute an "other arrangement" within the purview of section
543(a)(6). The position of the Second Circuit, supported by the
Internal Revenue Service in Revenue Ruling 65-259, 91 is that sec-
tion 543(a)(6) controls the lessor-lessee arrangement. 98 To evalu-
ate the relative merits of these countervailing positions, this Note
will proceed to examine the authority relied upon to support the
two approaches and to examine additional sources of authority or
analogy not previously employed.
II. EXAMINATION OF AUTHORITY RELIED UPON BY THE
COURTS
The courts have relied upon various authorities in formulating
their positions on the personal holding company income issue.
These authorities include legislative histories, general tax princi-
ples, and related case law.
93. See infra notes 133-48 and accompanying text.
94. 620 F.2d at 319.
95. Id. at 318-19.
96. 4 T.C. 280, acq., 1945 C.B. 2, acq. withdrawn andnonacq substituted, 1965-2 C.B. 7
(1944).
97. 1965-2 C.B. 174; see supra note 71 for the relevant text of the Revenue Ruling.
98. 320 E. 47th St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1957); see supra text
accompanying notes 61-67.
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A. Legislative History of Section 543(a)(6)
An examination into the legislative history of a statute is the
first step in gaining an insight into its intended application. The
legislative history of section 543(a)(6) indicates at least two rele-
vant areas of congressional concern--ease of administration, and
fairness to bona fide lease arrangements. These arose at the time
of the initial enactment of the personal holding company provi-
sions in 1934,11 and again when the statutory predecessor to sec-
tion 543(a)(6) was enacted in 1937.1°° Section 543(a)(6) has
changed little since its original enactment. The only significant
alteration has been the addition of a requirement that the corpora-
tion also have other forms of personal holding company income
comprising at least ten percent of its ordinary gross income in or-
der to trigger application of the section. 10
1. Old Section 351
The personal holding company penalty tax was created by the
Revenue Act of 1934.102 At that time it consisted of only a single
and now defunct provision, (section 351, which should not be con-
fused with the present section 351), which labeled royalties, divi-
dends, interest, annuities, and capital gains as personal holding
company income. 10 3 The House report accompanying the bill
enunciated an intent to prevent the use of "incorporated pocket-
books"-the sham corporations used to shelter the investment in-
come of high tax bracket individuals now commonly known as
personal holding companies. °4 Old section 351, the personal
holding company provision, was created by splitting the currently
existing section 104 into two parts. 05 Section 104 was the
equivalent of the modern excess accumulated profits tax prov-
sion,10 6 which places a fifty percent tax penalty on the excessive
accumulation of profits by any corporation when such accumula-
tion is for the purpose of avoiding high shareholder tax brackets.
Section 104 had long been available to prevent these incorporated
99. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 351, 48 Stat. 680, 751; see infra notes 102-11 and
accompanying text.
100. Revenue Act of 1937, ch. 815, § 353, 50 Stat. 813, 814.
101. I.R.C. § 543(a)(6)(B) (1976).
102. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 351, 48 Stat. 680, 751.
103. Id.
104. See supra note 3.
105. Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 104, 47 Stat. 169, 195, as amended by National
Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 214, 48 Stat. 195, 207 (1933).
106. I.R.C. §§ 531-537 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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pocketbooks, but had been largely ineffective due to the necessity
of proving a tax avoidance purpose. 0 7 Thus, it became necessary
for Congress to enact a separate provision to specifically address
this tax avoidance scheme. 108 The major change from section 104
was the elimination of the "tax avoidance" language. The House
report explained the operation of the newly enacted section 351 as
follows:
The effect of this system recommended by your committee is to
provide for a tax which will be automatically levied upon the
holding company without any necessityfor proving a purpose of
avoiding surtaxes. It is believed that the majority of these cor-
porations are in fact formed for the sole purpose of avoiding
the imposition of the surtax upon the stockholders.' 0 9
The language of the 1934 House report seems to support the
view of the Second Circuit in 320 East 47th Street which holds
that a tax avoidance purpose in corporate formulation is irrelevant
to the issue of applicability of the personal holding company
tax.10 The House report suggests that one of the reasons for the
creation of these provisions was to eliminate the need for showing
a tax avoidance purpose. This impliedly tends to refute the First
Circuit's position which found the presence or absence of tax
avoidance purpose determinative." '
2. Revenue Act of 1937 Additions
Congress appointed a Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and
Avoidance" 12 in 1937 to investigate methods of evasion and avoid-
ance of income, estate, and gift taxes, and to recommend statutory
resolutions to eliminate the loopholes discovered. The recommen-
dations of this committee were later included in identical House
and Senate reports accompanying the resulting statutory propos-
als." 3 As part of its scheme of statutory proposals to eliminate
perceived means of tax evasion, the committee recommended that
the list of enumerated forms of personal holding company income
be amended to include two additional categories: rents, and com-
107. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
110. See 243 F.2d 894, 899 (2d Cir. 1957); supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
111. Silverman & Sons Realty Trust v. Commissioner, 620 F.2d 314, 318-19 (1st Cir.
1980); see supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
112. Revenue Act of 1937, ch. 815, § 353, 50 Stat. 813, 814.
113. HousE REPORT, supra note 13, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 703; S. REP. No. 1242,
75th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 703; see supra note 13.
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pensation for the use of corporate property by a twenty-five per-
cent or more shareholder."14  The recommendations were
subsequently enacted as part of the Revenue Act of 1937.115
The joint committee's analysis of the proposal to add the cate-
gory of compensation for the use of corporate property first dis-
cussed the tax evasion scheme that necesitated its proposal: the
practice of transferring an individual's personal assets to a per-
sonal holding company. The report cites as an example the lease-
back of an individual's yacht, city residence, and country house in
order to provide the holding company with sufficient nonpersonal
holding company income to escape the penalty tax."t6 The com-
mittee concluded that "[b]y including this type of income in the
definition of personal holding company income, your committee
removes this method of tax avoidance.""' 7 The language of the
report thus indicates that the abuse to be curtailed was limited to
the scheme involving tax evasion motives and personal or non-
business types of assets, and did not include the bona fide business
corporation arrangements described earlier. The report also re-
peatedly refers to the leasing of corporate assets by an individ-
ual." 8 Finally, the report expresses the desire "not to interfere
with bona fide and legitimate operating companies, whose busi-
ness consisted of ownership and operation of office buildings,
apartment houses, etc."" 9 It is significant that the leased property
in 320 East 47th Street, the major case supporting the position of
114. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 5-6, reprinted in 1939-I C.B. at 707-08.
115. Revenue Act of 1937, ch. 815, § 353, 50 Stat. 813, 814.
116. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 6, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. at 708. For an
examination of the present 60% personal holding company income requirement, see supra
note 8.
117. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 6, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. at 708.
118. Id.
119. Id. When using this language, the report discusses the proposed addition of sub-
section (g)-Rents, not subsection (f)-Compensation for the use of corporate property.
However, the words still indicate Congress' intent to spare bona fide business operations
from the personal holding company tax penalties. Subsections (g) and (f) were enacted
concurrently to prevent the avoidance of the personal holding company provisions by the
incorporation of personal assets. The report states in pertinent part:
Subsection (g) includes as personal holding company income, rents which do not
constitute 50 percent or more of the gross income. For this purpose, rents are
defined as compensation, however designated for the use of, or right to use, prop-
erty. But rents do not include compensation received for the use of property cov-
ered by subsection (f) (rent of yachts, airplanes, etc., to shareholders). Under
existing law, rents are excluded from the 80-percent classification. This was done
principally so as not to interfere with bona-fide and legitimate operating compa-
nies, whose business consisted of the ownership and operation of office buildings,
apartment houses, etc.
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the Commissioner, was, in fact, an office building.1 20
The 1937 committee report, in contrast to the earlier 1934
committee reports, is consistent with the position of the First and
Sixth Circuits. Its reference to the examples of personal and non-
business types of property used in the leasing schemes supports
the validity of the First Circuit's position in Silverman & Sons.12 1
The Silverman & Sons test provides in part that the type of prop-
erty leased under the arrangement is an important consideration
in determining whether section 543(a)(6) should be invoked. The
later congressional intention not to interfere with bona fide and
legitimate operating companies is significant not only because it
upholds the taxpayers position, but also because it nearly diamet-
rically conflicts with the position expressed in the 1934 House re-
port. 122 This dichotomy suggests the simultaneous existence of
two countervailing congressional purposes. First, a rule was
sought which could be easy to administer and difficult to evade,
by eliminating the requirement that the Commissioner prove a tax
avoidance purpose in the establishment of a personal holding
company. Second, bona fide business operations were to be pro-
tected from arbitrary tax penalties. The simultaneous existence of
these two motives has understandably contributed to the confu-
sion in the resulting statutory schemes.
B. Section 223
Section 223 of the Code was a temporary provision enacted by
the Revenue Act of 1950.123 Significantly, it was enacted primarily
in response to the situations arising in the cases discussed ear-
lier.'2n The application of section 223 was originally limited to
taxable years ending between 1945 and 1950, but was later ex-
120. 320 E. 47th St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 894, 895 (2d Cir. 1957).
121. 620 F.2d 314 (1st Cir. 1980); see supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
122. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934). The House report expressly
rejected any need to examine the motive or purpose in creating the leasing arrangement.
Id. For a discussion of the 1934 House report, see supra notes 102-11 and accompanying
text.
123. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 223, 64 Stat. 906, 947, as amended by Act of Au-
gust 11, 1955, ch. 808, § 223, 69 Stat. 693, 693. Section 223 reads as follows:
SEC. 223. PERSONAL HOLDING COMPANY INCOME. Section 502(f) of
the Internal Revenue Code (relating to use of corporation property by a share-
holder) shall not apply with respect to rents received during taxable years ending
after December 31, 1945, and before January 1, 1950, if such rents were received
for the use by the lessee, in the operation of a bona fide commercial, industrial, or
mining enterprise, of property of the taxpayer.
124. For a representative fact situation, see supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
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tended to include taxable years through 1953.125 A consideration
of section 223 and its legislative history is useful in evaluating the
application of section 543(a)(6) to the lessor-lessee corporation
arrangement. 2
6
Section 223 provided that section 502(f), the then-existing
counterpart of current section 543(a)(6), would not apply to rents
received during the taxable years ending between 1945 and 1950 if
such rents were received for the use of the corporation's property
by the lessee "in the operation of a bona fide commercial, indus-
trial or mining enterprise."'' 27 These bona fide business lease ar-
rangements would otherwise have qualified under section 502(f).
Section 223 was not limited to lease arrangements involving cor-
porate lessees, but relieved all types of bona fide lease arrange-
ments from application of the penalty tax.'28
The Senate report accompanying the Revenue Act of 1950129
states unequivocally that the statute was a specific response to
problems arising under the lessor-lessee arrangement:
The attention of your committee has been called to examples
where, through a set of fortuitous circumstances, corporations
have become closely held and also have rented most of their
assets for use in the operation of businesses to the individuals
holding the stock of the companies. Thus, unwittingly the cor-
porations have become personal holding companies and subject
to the penalty tax.
While your committee recognizes that such arrangements
could result in tax avoidance, and, therefore, does not permit
such practices in the future, it believes that relief for past years
should be given where such arrangements have been unwit-
tingly entered into with no thought of tax avoidance.' 30
This statement indicates the congressional awareness of, and sym-"
pathy for, the entrapment of bona fide business lessors in situa-
tions like the lessor-lessee arrangement. Despite such apparent
sympathy for the taxpayer, however, the report also reveals that
Congress deliberately chose to limit its relief to the prescribed
period. '3'
125. Act of August I1, 1955, ch. 808, 69 Stat. 693. No reason was given for the exten-
sion of the period of applicabilty of § 223.
126. S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1950). For pertinent language from the
report, see supra text accompanying note 130.
127. See Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 223, 64 Stat. 906, 947, as amended by Act of
August 11, 1955, ch. 808, § 223, 69 Stat. 693, 693.
128. See S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1950).
129. .d.
130. Id at 65.
131. Id. In spite of the statement that the committee "does not permit such practices in
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Section 223 and its legislative history must be viewed as sup-
porting the position of the Internal Revenue Service. The Senate
report shows a congressional recognition of the unfairness caused
by the application of section 543(a)(6) to bona fide business lease
arrangements. It also indicates that the use by section 223 of a
bona fide business purpose test in determining the applicability of
section 502(f) supports the workability of the First Circuit's pos-
tion in Silverman & Sons. 32 Nevertheless, the report appears to
unequivocally evince a congressional intent to disallow the pres-
ence of a bona fide business puipose to prevent the applicability of
the statute to present lessor-lessee corporate arrangements.
C. The Corporate Entity Concept
The concept of the corporate entity-that the corporation is an
entity separate and distinct from its shareholders, with the share-
holders having no right to personal use of the assets of the corpo-
ration-has been at the heart of every court decision upholding
the taxpayer's position that section 543(a)(6) should not apply to
the lessor-lessee corporate arrangement. 133 The pro-taxpayer de-
cisions relying on it read the corporate entity concept as an estab-
lished, black letter rule of law. The existence of such a strongly
established entity concept obviously would lend great support to
the taxpayer's position by indicating that the mere rental of the
lessor corporation's property by the shareholder's corporation
does not give that shareholder an indirect right to use the property
personally, as in the "other arrangement" provision of section
543(a)(6). 134 The resulting question, therefore, is whether the cor-
porate entity concept is indeed as firmly established as the First
Circuit and the Tax Court believe it to be.
Substantial authority supports the corporate entity concept.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a corporation is a
separate entity for federal income taxation purposes135-a view
the future," § 223 was amended five years later to have its application extended through
1953. See supra note 125.
132. 620 F.2d 314 (1st Cir. 1980).
133. See, e.g., Silverman & Sons Realty Trust v. Commissioner, 620 F.2d 314 (1st Cir.
1980); 320 E. 47th St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 545 (1956), rev'd, 243 F.2d 894 (2d
Cir. 1957); Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 280 (1944), acq., 1945 C.B.
2, acq. withdrawn and nonacq substituted, 1965-2 C.B. 7; see supra text accompanying notes
46-47, 57-60, & 89-95.
134. For the text of I.R.C. § 543(a)(6), see supra note 9.
135. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 440 (1939); New Colonial
Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 442 (1934).
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adopted regularly by both courts and commentators. 136 It has
been broadly stated that "a stockholder as such has no title, legal
or equitable, to the corporation's property."'' 37 The case law
plainly upholds the First Circuit's statement in Silverman & Sons
that "[a] bona fide corporation is not the equivalent of a 'sublease
or other arrangement' for the simple reason that whereas the latter
would legally authorize personal use, the former does not.' 138
Thus, the corporate entity concept appears to be a firmly en-
trenched judicial doctrine.
The corporate entity concept has not, however, gone unchal-
lenged. The doctrine has been questioned with respect to the
stock attribution provisions of the Internal Revenue Code found
in section 318.'13 This section provides that under certain condi-
tions the stock owned by a corporation will be considered owned
by its fifty percent or more shareholder. n4 However, the personal
holding company provisions are not among the sections to which
the section 318 attribution rules apply. Section 318 applies only
when activated by another Code section to stock transfer or re-
demption transactions. 14 ' Additionally, section 318 is limited to
attributing ownership of the corporation's stock assets only to fifty
percent or more shareholders. 4z These limitations indicate that
section 318 is to be interpreted narrowly, and cannot be used to
suggest a general rejection of the corporate entity concept.
A more powerful argument for rejecting the corporate entity
concept arises under Code section 544143 Section 544 also con-
tains attribution rules but is both part of the personal holding
company provisions and expressly applicable to section 543(a)(6).
Section 544 provides that for purposes of section 543(a)(6), stock
owned by a corporation will be considered as being owned pro-
136. See 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 31
(1974).
137. Howell Turpentine Co. v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 319, 322 (5th Cir. 1947) (al-
though they could contract to sell it, shareholders of a corporation could not themselves
convey the corporation's property short of liquidation).
138. Silverman & Sons Realty Trust v. Commissioner, 620 F.2d 314,318 (lst Cir. 1980)
(emphasis added); see supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
139. I.R.C. § 318 (1976).
140. Id. § 318(a)(2)(C) (1976).
141. Id. § 318(a) (1976). Examples of Code sections invoking the application of§ 318
are I.R.C. §§ 302 (distributions in redemption of stock), 306 (dispositions of certain types of
preferred stock), and 334 (basis provision for property received in certain liquidations).
142. Id. § 318(a)(2)(C).
143. Id. § 544.
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portionately by its shareholders.'" At least with respect to shares
of stock in other companies held by the corporation, this section
suspends the protection of the corporate entity concept in section
543(a)(6) applications. Since section 544 is made expressly appli-
cable to section 543(a)(6), one can argue that attribution to share-
holders should be made of other property rights of the
corporation, including the indirect right to reach the corporation's
property for personal use. This might constitute an "other ar-
rangement" within the definition of section 543(a)(6).
The validity of such a construction, however, seems remote.
The provisions are limited to attributing ownership of shares of
stock only; they do not attribute ownership of general corporate
assets. The authority supporting the corporate entity concept and
its general application for federal income tax purposes is over-
whelming. 145 Even the Second Circuit, which refused in 320 East
47th Street14 6 to employ the doctrine to protect the lessor-lessee
corporate arrangement, was forced to acknowledge the general
application of the entity concept in federal tax matters. The court
stated that "while it is true that under [New Colonial Ice Co. v.
Helvering147] the corporation is an entity for the purpose of the
imposition of taxes, the two sole shareholders of a corporation in-
directly do have the use of its leased property."' 48 The Second
Circuit then applied section 543(a)(6) to the arrangement while
recognizing the validity of the corporate entity concept. Despite
this judicial legerdemain, the court's inability to offer any author-
ity for rejecting the application of the corporate entity concept
demonstrates the strength of the doctrine.
D. The Partnershi Context
In contrast to the sharp division of opinion characterizing ad-
judication of the applicability of section 543(a)(6) to lease ar-
rangements where the lessee is another corporation having
shareholders identical to those of the lessor corporation, no such
division exists in the partnership area. The courts have univer-
144. Id. § 544(a)(1).
145. See Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1939); New Colonial
Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934); 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 31 (1974) (discussion of the corporate entity concept and deci-
sions in support of the concept).
146. 320 E. 47th St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1957); see supra text
accompanying notes 61-67.
147. 292 U.S. 435 (1934).
148. 243 F.2d at 898; see supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
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sally agreed that section 543(a)(6) will apply where the lessee is a
partnership whose partners comprise substantially all of the share-
holders of the lessor corporation. 49 The basis for this distinction
is the absence of any similar entity concept in partnership law. 50
A partnership has not generally been recognized in the law as an
entity distinct from its individual partners for federal tax pur-
poses. 51 Thus, the primary reason cited by the courts in uphold-
ing the taxpayer's position in the corporate-lessee cases-that the
shareholder does not by the arrangement gain a right to personal
use of the leased assets-is unavailable in the partnership context.
The prevailing rule there is quite apposite: "A partner is a co-
owner with his partners of specific partnership property, holding
as a tenant in partnership."'
15 2
The partnership-lessee cases have broadly insisted on the ap-
plication of section 543(a)(6) to the lease arrangements, and courts
have refused to stay the application of the section even in a case
where local state law held that a partnership was an entity sepa-
rate and apart from its partners.'53 The court ruled that the federal
revenue statutes have their own criteria independent of local
law. 154
The contrast between the partnership-lessee decisions favoring
the Commissioner's position and the pro-taxpayer corporate-
lessee decisions is reconcilable. The absence of the corporate en-
tity concept in the partnership cases distinguishes these from the
former cases. In fact, the partnership cases tend to support the
149. See, e.g., Randolph Prods. Co. v. Manning, 176 F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1949); Hatfried,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1947); Walnut St. Co. v. Glenn, 83 F. Supp.
945 (D. Ky. 1948); Western Transmission Corp. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 818 (1952); Fur-
niture Fin. Corp., 46 B.T.A. 240 (1942).
150. See, eg., Western Transmission Corp. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 818 (1952). The
court noted the differences in holdings between the partnership cases (citing Randolph
Prods. Co. and Walnut St. Co.), and the holding in Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 4 T.C. 280 (1944), acq., 1945 C.B. 2, acq. withdrawn andnonacq. substituted, 1965-2
C.B. 7. See supra notes 31-47 and accompanying text. The court attributed the difference
in holdings to the presence of the corporate entity concept in Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc.
151. See Randolph Prods. Co. v. Manning, 176 F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1949); Jennings v.
Commissioner, 110 F.2d 945, 946 (5th Cir. 1945); I.R.C. §§ 701, 702 (1976).
152. Commissioner v. Whitney, 169 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 892
(1948) (quoting N.Y. Partnership Law § 51 (Consol. 1948); see also UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP
AcT § 25 (1914). In a limited partnership, the limited partners do not hold as tenants in
partnership with the general partners.
153. See, e.g., Western Transmission Corp. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 818 (1952).
154. Id. at 822-23. The court stated that "such a distinction [provided by the peculiar
Michigan law] is immaterial for the reason that the Federal revenue statutes have their own
criteria, and their applicability is not dependent upon local Michigan law." Id.
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position of the corporate-lessee situation because they demon-
strate by negative implication the power of the corporate entity
doctrine as a valid device to remove a business lease arrangement
from the reach of section 543(a)(6).'11 Thus, the most significant
contribution of the partnership-lessee decisions, for the purposes
of this Note, is their emphasis of the crucial role played by the
corporate entity concept in the First and Sixth Circuits'56 and in
the Tax Court. 15
7
E. Tax Avoidance Purpose
The relevance of a tax avoidance purpose in creating the les-
sor-lessee corporation arrangement in determining applicability of
section 543(a)(6) has been essential in the reasoning used by both
sides in the controversy.' 5 The Tax Court and the First Circuit
Court of Appeals both assert that the absence of a tax avoidance
purpose is a relevant consideration in determining the applicabil-
ity of the section. Accordingly, both courts have tended to excuse
the taxpayer when the leasing arrangement appears to have been
created merely for a reason independent of avoiding the applica-
bility of section 543(a)(6). t59 This consideration was especially
important in Silverman & Sons,161 in which the First Circuit pre-
scribed a test for the application of section 543(a)(6) based primar-
ily on an examination of tax avoidance purpose. 16 ' The Second
155. For a reference to the distinctive power of the corporate entity concept to prevent
the application of § 543(a)(6) to a business lease arrangement, see Western Transmission
Corp. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 818, 822 (1952).
156. Allied Indus. Cartage Co. v. Commissioner, 647 F.2d 713 (6th Cir. 1981);
Silverman & Sons Realty Trust v. Commissioner, 620 F.2d 314 (1st Cir. 1980).
157. 320 E. 47th St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 545 (1956), rev'd, 243 F.2d 894 (2d
Cir. 1957); Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 280 (1944), acq., 1945 C.B.
2, acq. withdrawn and nonacq substituted, 1965-2 C.B. 7.
158. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text discussing the holding in Minnesota
Mortuaries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 280 (1944), acq., 1945 C.B. 2, acq. withdrawn and
nonacq substituted, 1965-2 C.B. 7; supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text for discussion
of Silverman & Sons Realty Trust v. Commissioner, 620 F.2d 314 (1st Cir. 1980); cf. supra
notes 61-68 and accompanying text discussing 320 E. 47th Street Corp. v. Commissioner,
243 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1957) (emphasis on strict net economic effect rather than tax avoid-
ance purpose).
159. See Allied Indus. Cartage Co. v. Commissioner, 647 F.2d 713 (6th Cir. 1981);
Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 280 (1944), acq., 1945 C.B. 2, acq.
withdrawn and nonacq substituted, 1965-2 C.B. 7.
160. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
161. 620 F.2d 314. The court stated its views on tax avoidance purpose as follows:
The Commissioner argues that the Tax Court, in reaching its decision, mistak-
enly relied on a distinction between those rental arrangements having a business
purpose and those having only a tax-related purpose. This distinction, it is ar-
gued, is a false one, because the statute has long been interpreted as reaching both
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Circuit in 320 East 47h Street 6 2 declared unequivocally that the
absence of a tax avoidance purpose in formation of the lessee cor-
poration could have no effect on the issue. Hence, section
543(a)(6) was applicable. 6 3
What is the proper role of a tax avoidance purpose in deciding
the application of section 543(a)(6)? There is no statutory or case
law mandate either demanding or prohibiting the examination
into tax avoidance purpose. Certain tax statutes are applied
mechanically, due to established judicial practice or because of
statutory language or history.164 Other statutes, such as the excess
accumulated earnings tax provisions, 165 specifically incorporate
references to tax avoidance purpose and thus statutorily demand
an investigation into this issue.
One of the main reasons advanced for establishing the special
personal holding company provisions in 1934 was the difficulty in
enforcing the excess accumulated earnings tax provisions because
of the need to prove a tax avoidance motive. 66 The House re-
port167 accompanying the 1934 Act stated that the holding com-
pany provisions would be "automatically levied upon the
company without any necessity for proving a purpose of avoiding
surtaxes."'' 6 The Second Circuit has relied heavily on this state-
types of arrangements where the lease is to an individual or partnership ....
Whatever the force of this argument in other contexts, we do not think it answers
the question before us. The issue is whether the statute is to be construed so as to
impute to individuals the property rights of a corporation in which they own
stock. Absent explicit Congressional guidance, this is a step any court should be
reluctant to take. . . . We agree with the Tax Court that a relevant consideration
is whether the step is necessary to prevent a scheme of tax avoidance. Where, as
here, there is no showing the arrangement is other than a bona fide business trans-
action, we see no necessary implication that Congress intended to impose a per-
sonal holding company tax on the lessor corporation.
Id. at 319.
162. 320 E. 47th St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1957). See supra text
accompanying notes 61-67.
163. 243 F.2d at 899; see supra text accompanying notes 61-66.
164. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970), holding business purpose
irrelevant to the determination of dividend equivalence. Further examples of mechanical
application are the retirement and pension plan provisions of the Code-§§ 401-418, under
which a tax avoidance motive is ignored when testing pension or profit sharing plan quali-
fication in terms of vesting, participation, or funding. Finally, I.R.C. § 2035 was amended
in 1976 so as to replace its rebuttable presumption with a provision which automatically
includes in the gross estate gifts by a decedent within the three years preceding his or her
death.
165. I.R.C. §§ 531-537 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); see supra notes 105-07 and accompa-
nying text.
166. See supra notes 99-122 and accompanying text.
167. H. R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
168. Id. at 12; see supra text accompanying note 109.
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ment in support of its position that the lack of a tax avoidance
purpose is not a relevant consideration. 69 The position of the
Second Circuit rests upon its earlier decision in O'Sullivan Rubber
Co. v. Commissioner,170 which also involved the application of the
personal holding company provisions, and which determined that
the absence of tax avoidance purpose was irrelevant. In that case,
the court stated that "[i]n enacting the very section being applied
here, Congress was attempting to foreclose the defense, available
under [the excess earnings tax provisions], that the accumulation
of profits was responsive to a legitimate business need." 't The
court then quoted the same language from the 1934 House report
included above and continued:
Having before us indisputable proof from the exactitude of sec-
tion 351 itself, reinforced by the Committee reports, that Con-
gress wished to establish objective criteria for imposition of the
tax, we cannot, by probing into corporate motives, undertake to
relieve from the alleged harshness of a particular application of
the statute.' 72
O'Sullivan Rubber and the 1934 House report both demon-
strate a secondary ground of support for the Second Circuit posi-
tion-the problem of practical administration. As indicated, the
great difficulty in enforcing excess earnings tax provisions had
been the primary reason for the creation of the special holding
company provisions in 1934 . 73 The need to prove a tax avoid-
ance purpose had created too much of a barrier to successful en-
forcement, thus warranting an objective test. To readopt the
consideration of a tax avoidance purpose in gauging the applica-
bility of the personal holding company tax might revive the diffi-
culties formerly experienced, thus allowing offenders to escape the
penalty provisions by fraudulently concealing their tax avoidance
169. 320 E. 47th St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1957); see supra text
accompanying notes 61-68.
170. 120 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1941).
171. Id. at 847. The court observed:
It is... abundantly clear that Congress, in correcting an evil, is not narrowly
confined to the specific instances which suggested the remedy. Of course, all per-
sonal holding companies were not conceived in sin-many were organized for
legitimate personal or business reasons; but Congress has made little distinction
between the goats and the sheep.
Id. See also Rudick, Section 102 and Personal Holding Company Provisions of the Internal
Code, 49 YALE L. 171 (1939).
172. 120 F.2d at 848.
173. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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motives. 74 The proposed First Circuit tax avoidance test, how-
ever, would not likely provoke the same administrative difficulties
as were experienced with the old excess earnings tax provisions.175
The more flexible First Circuit test allows the court to decide for
itself whether a tax avoidance purpose is present, based on an
overall subjective review of the evidence. It need not find actual
proof of the existence of a tax avoidance purpose.1 76 Neverthe-
less, administration of the section under this test could not equal
the ease of application offered by the Second Circuit position.
The pro-taxpayer decisions of the Tax Court and First Circuit
all cited Gregory v. Helvering 177 -a Supreme Court decision deal-
ing with a corporate reorganization question--to support their as-
sertion that the absence of a tax avoidance purpose was a relevant
consideration. 78 In Gregory, the Supreme Court approved of an
inquiry into the taxpayer's motives which had produced a finding
that the taxpayer was motivated by a tax avoidance purpose. 7 9
The Court observed that "[t]he rule which excludes from consider-
ation the motive of tax avoidance is not pertinent to the situation,
because the transaction upon its face lies outside the plain intent
of the statute."180 The statute involved was section 112 of the Rev-
enue Act of 1928,181 which permitted the shareholder of a corpo-
174. See the discussion of the rationale of O'Sullivan Rubber Co. in the text accompa-
nying notes 61-67 supra.
175. Revenue Act of 1932 ch. 209, § 104, 47 Stat. 169, 195, as amended by Act of June
16, 1933, ch. 90, § 214, 48 Stat. 195, 207 (1935).
176. Silverman & Sons Realty Trust v. Commissioner, 620 F.2d 314, 318 (Ist Cir.
1980).
177. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
178. See, eg. Silverman & Sons Realty Trust v. Commissioner, 620 F.2d 314 (Ist Cir.
1980); Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 280 (1944), acq., 1945 C.B. 2,
acq. withdrawn and nonacq. substituted, 1965-2 C.B. 7.
179. 293 U.S. at 469-70. The Court explained its view of the arrangement in Gregory
as follows:
Simply an operation having no business or corporate purpose-a mere device
which put on the form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for concealing
its real character, and the sole object and accomplishment of which was the con-
summation of a preconceived plan, not to reorganize a business or any part of a
business, but to transfer a parcel of corporate shares to the petitioner. No doubt,
a new and valid corporation was created. But that corporation was nothing more
than a contrivance to the end last described .... The whole undertaking, though
conducted according to the terms ofsubdivision (B), was in fact an elaborate and
devious form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate reorganization, and
nothing else.
Id.
180. Id. at 470.
181. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 112, 45 Stat. 791, 816-18. Section 112 read in
pertinent part:
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ration undergoing a reorganization to receive a tax-free partial
distribution of the assets.
The taxpayer in Gregory wanted to remove assets from a cor-
poration she controlled without incurring dividend treatment. 82
Toward that end, she formed a second sham corporation to re-
ceive the assets from the original corporation, which would then
"reorganize" under section 112, distributing the assets to the tax-
payer. The scheme was obviously a ruse to avoid tax liability.
This situation thus differed significantly from that which typically
arises with respect to section 543(a)(6). As the Court stated, to
permit the Gregory sham would be "to exalt artifice above reality
and to deprive the statutory provision in question of all serious
purpose."' 83 The obviousness of the tax avoidance scheme in
Gregory suggests that the case is of doubtful support for the posi-
tion of the Tax Court and the First and Sixth Circuits. Section
112 contained no legislative history similar to that of the holding
company provision 84 (which indicated that the statute was to be
applied without reference to the presence of tax avoidance pur-
pose), and the Gregory court could hardly have allowed this overt
abuse of section 112 to circumvent the tax on dividend income.
The most direct support for the position that the absence of a
tax avoidance purpose should be considered in deciding whether
to apply section 543(a)(6) comes not from case law, but from the
previously discussed report of the Joint Committee on Tax Eva-
sion and Avoidance which accompanied the 1937 Act.' 85 The re-
port expressed a desire on the part of Congress not to interfere
(g) Distribution of stock on reorganization.-If there is distributed, in pursu-
ance of a plan of reorganization, to a shareholder in a corporation a party to the
reorganization, stock or securities in such corporation or in another corporation a
party to the reorganization, without the surrender by such shareholder of stock or
securities in such a corporation, no gain to the distributee from the receipt of such
stock or securities shall be recognized.
(i) Definition of reorganization.-As used in this section...
(1) The term "reorganization" means. .. (B) a transfer by a corporation
of all or a part of its assets to another corporation if immediately after the transfer
the transferor or its stockholders or both are in control of the corporation to
which the assets are transferred ....
Id.
182. 293 U.S. at 467.
183. Id. at 470.
184. See supra notes 99-122 and accompanying text.
185. H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 337, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1937). The recommendations
of the joint committee were concurred in by the House Ways and Means Committee and
made part of its report to the Congress. HousE REPORT, supra note 13, reprinted in 1939-1
(Part 2) C.B. 708. For a discussion of the report, see supra notes 112-22 and accompanying
text.
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with bona fide and legitimate operating companies.1 86 Because
there is no general rule regarding the examination of avoidance
purpose in the tax area, the indications provided by the legislative
history of a statute become almost determinative. In this area,
however, even the legislative history itself provides no clear reso-
lution.187 Nevertheless, Congress did state at the time df the origi-
nal enactment of the personal holding company provisions that
they were created to avoid the need to prove a tax avoidance pur-
pose in enforcement-and that statement may be considered sup-
portive for the Second Circuit position. 188
That section 223189 legislative history would provide relief
from section 543(a)(6) for bona fide business leases in the past but
would "not permit such practices in the future"' 90 also buttresses
the Second Circuit's view. Nevertheless, the very creation of sec-
tion 223 evidences a congressional awareness of the pitfalls for
innocent taxpayers that have been created by section 543(a)(6)
and its desire not to see bona fide business operations inflicted
with the tax penalty.
III. A SUGGESTED SOLUTION
This Note has attempted to detail the conflicts regarding the
application of section 543(a)(6) to the lessor-lessee corporation,
and to examine the evidence supporting each position. Both posi-
tions have strong supporting authority; both are subject to strong
countervailing considerations.' 9' Neither is entirely satisfactory.
The present form of section 543(a)(6) has created a no-win situa-
tion and the adoption of either position must necessarily produce
some undesirable results.
The position of the Internal Revenue Service and the Second
Circuit,19z which would apply section 543(a)(6) objectively to all
lessor-lessee corporate relationships while simply ignoring both
186. See supra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. Compare HousE REPORT, supra note
13, at 6, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. at 708 (indicating a need to protect bona fide business tax
arrangements) with H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934) (regarding as unnec-
essary the need to prove tax avoidance purpose).
188. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1934).
189. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 944, § 223, 64 Stat. 906, 907, as amended by Act of Au-
gust 11, 1955, ch. 808, § 223, 69 Stat. 693, 693; see supra notes 125-32 and accompanying
text.
190. S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1950).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 61-67 & 89-97.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 61-68.
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the corporate entity concept and the issue of tax avoidance pur-
pose, means that all such arrangements will receive personal hold-
mg company treatment. Thus, the use of section 543(a)(6) to avoid
the penalty surtax by creation of a second sham corporation to
lease the corporate assets would be foreclosed. Unfortunately,
such an approach will also impose the penalty tax upon valid
business arrangements by innocent taxpayers merely trying to se-
cure nontax organizational advantages of the type seen in Minne-
sota Mortuaries, Inc. 193
The Tax Court position is that, because of the corporate entity
concept, section 543(a)(6) can never be applied to lessor-lessee
corporation arrangements.194 The obvious problem with this ap-
proach was explained by the Second Circuit in 320 East 47th
Street.'95 It would allow even bad faith taxpayers seeking to
evade taxes to escape section 543(a)(6) and to frustrate the per-
sonal holding company provisions merely by creating a second
sham corporation to rent their personal assets from the first, in-
stead of doing so directly.
The adoption of either of these positions will yield some form
of undesirable consequences. A possible solution is to amend sec-
tion 543(a)(6) to include "tax avoidance purpose" language-that
is, language requiring that an avoidance purpose be present before
the statute can be applied. Additionally, the statute should be
amended to provide that such a purpose will be presumed, with
the burden of proof on the taxpayer to rebut such presumption.' 96
193. 4 T.C. 280 (1944), acq., 1945 C.B. 2, acq. withdrawn andnonacq. substituted, 1965-2
C.B. 7; see supra text accompanying note 38.
194. See Allied Indus. Cartage Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 515 (1979), ap d per
curiam, 647 F.2d 715 (6th Cir. 1981); Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C.
280 (1944), acq., 1945 C.B. 2, acq. withdrawn and nonacq substituted, 1965-2 C.B. 7; supra
notes 31-46 & 74-85 and accompanying text.
195. 320 E. 47th St. Corp. v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1957); see supra text
accompanying notes 61-68.
196. The "conditions for the presumption of tax avoidance purpose" would be the
same statutory requirements found in § 543(a)(6) for its application now. The proposed
amendment to § 543(a)(6) might read as follows:
(C). Subparagraph (A) shall apply only if, in addition to the requirement of sub-
paragraph (B), the compensation received by the corporation was not received as
part of an arrangement created merely for the purpose of avoiding the personal
holding company tax provided in section 541 of this chapter.
Burden of Proof.
If the conditions of subparagraphs (A), (B), and (D) have been met, the taxpayer
shall bear the burden of proof of showing that the arrangement providing the
corporation with compensation for the use of its assets was not entered into
merely for the purpose of avoiding the personal holding company tax.
The present subparagraph (C) would be reclassified as subparagraph (D).
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Adoption of this scheme would allow the courts to excuse the tax-
payer when it is clear that the arrangement is not being used as
part of a tax avoidance scheme, but would enable the courts to
impose section 543(a)(6) treatment where they deem it appropriate
without the need to find actual proof of a tax avoidance purpose.
Such a provision would not return the courts to the same situation
they faced before the adoption of the personal holding company
provisions. 197 Under the old accumulated earnings tax provisions,
the government, not the taxpayer, had to bear the burden of proof.
It should be noted that the modem accumulated earnings tax pro-
visions have adopted the same statutory scheme as is presented
here. 198
Acceptance of the suggested statutory amendments would be
in effect an adoption of the proposed First Circuit test in Silverman
&Q Sons,'99 which mandated an inquiry into the existence of a tax
avoidance purpose, and a piercing of the corporate veil with a sec-
tion 543(a)(6) application for any such purpose discovered. The
First Circuit attempted to establish some objective factors to be
197. See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
198. I.R.C. §§ 531, 537 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Note particularly § 533. Evidence of
Purpose to Avoid Income Tax, which reads in pertinent part:
(a) Unreasonable accumulation determinative of purpose
For purposes of section 532, the fact that the earnings and profits of a corpora-
tion are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business
shall be determinative of the purpose to avoid the income tax with respect to the
shareholders, unless the corporation by apreponderance of the evidence shall prove
to the contrary.
I.R.C. § 533 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added).
Section 543(c) provides for the taxpayer to file a response statement upon notification from
the Secretary that earnings and profits have allegedly been permitted to accumulate beyond
the reasonable needs of the business. This statement would set forth "the grounds (together
with facts sufficient to show the basis thereof) on which taxpayer relies to establish that all
or any part of the earnings and profits have not been permitted to accumulate beyond the
reasonable needs of the business."
The language "bona fide business purpose" and "purpose to avoid federal income
taxes" is also found in other sections of the Code. Section 357, relating to tax-free assump-
tion of liability in corporate organizations and reorganizations, contains an essentially sim-
ilar scheme as that found in § 533 and suggested here for § 543. Subsection (C) provides for
the non-application of the benefits of § 357 when "it appears" that the "principal purpose"
of the taxpayer in arranging for the assumption of the liabilities was either a purpose to
avoid federal income tax or was otherwise not a bona fide business purpose. The subsec-
tion then states that a burden of proof on the taxpayer to prove that the transaction should
qualify for § 357 treatment is not met unless "taxpayer sustains such burden by the clear
preponderance of the evidence."
Other Code sections employing somewhat similar language are §§ 302(c) and
355(a)(1)(D).
199. Silverman & Sons Realty Trust v. Commissioner, 620 F.2d 314 (1st Cir. 1980); see
supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
CASE WESTERNV RESERVE LAW REVIEW
considered in the examination.2° These same factors might also
be useful in administering the proposed amended section
543(a)(6). One factor was an inquiry into the nature of the assets
being leased-whether they are business assets, or personal or rec-
reational type property. The latter is indicative of a non-business
arrangement. A second factor was whether the leased property
was actually being placed at the disposal of the individual share-
holder for his personal use. The presence of this factor also would
indicate a tax avoidance scheme.2°'
This proposed amendment to section 543(a)(6) would provide
a valuable and efficient administrative tool enabling the courts
and the Service to apply section 543(a)(6) to lease arrangements
without the need to find proof of a tax avoidance purpose when,
from their review of all relevant facts, they deem such action ap-
propriate. Taxpayers engaged in bona fide leasing arrangements
for business purposes could be excused. The result would be a
readily administratable statute protecting the interests of both tax-
payer and government.
IV. CONCLUSION
Barring the adoption of amendments to section 543(a)(6) such
as those proposed,20 2 the present stalemate20 3 regarding the appli-
cation of section 543(a)(6) to lessor-lessee corporation arrange-
ments will continue until the Supreme Court chooses to settle the
issue permanently. Under the present circumstances, many bona
fide corporate lease arrangements face the possibility of unexpect-
edly triggering the surtax penalty. Wealthy taxpayers can often
use personal holding companies to escape high taxes on their in-
vestment income by transferring their personal assets to the hold-
ing company and then leasing them back via a second sham
corporation, yet still providing the holding corporation with suffi-
200. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
201. Recall that the House report accompanying the bill enacting the original version
of § 543(a)(6) indicated that this subsection had been added to address the problem of
individuals who had previously circumvented the provisions by transferring to their hold-
ing companies their personal assets, such as yachts and townhouses, in addition to their
investment assets. These individuals would then rent these assets from the corporation in
order to give the company sufficient non-personal holding company income to avoid the
§ 542 60% personal holding company requirement, thus preventing the imposition of the
70% surtax on the company's accumulated investment income. See supra note 13 and ac-
companying text.
202. See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
990 [V/ol. 32:957
INTERCORPOR,4TE LEASING ARR,4NGEMENTS
cient non-personal holding company income to avoid the sixty
percent requirement.2°' Both positions on this issue thus present
unfair and unwanted consequences. Congress has the power to
cure this dilemma by adopting an amendment to section 543(a)(6)
that would permit taxpayers to be excused from its application
where they can prove an absence of tax avoidance purpose. In the
interest of sparing innocent taxpayers from an unwarranted tax
penalty, while still accomplishing the intended purpose of the sec-
tion, Congress should consider adopting such an amendment.
BRUCE W. MCCLAIN
204. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
